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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the scope for network platform business models oﬀering ‘automobility-as-a-service’ to
disrupt the existing automotive market and industry. The paper uses three examples (Getaround, BlaBlaCar and
Uber) to illustrate distinct versions of the network platform business model concept. Despite expectations that
automobility-as-a-service, enabled by digital platforms, may erode the market for new cars and the existing
model of individual car ownership, the paper argues that it is not necessarily disruptive to the incumbent au-
tomotive companies. Rather, network platform business models via automobility-as-a-service are argued to be
one mechanism by which the primacy of the car may be retained. In turn this has important implications for the
durability of the automotive industry, and of the unsustainable aspects of platform business models.
1. Introduction
This paper asks whether new network platform business models for
companies acting as intermediaries in the provision of automobility will
constitute a disruptive threat to the established automotive industry.
Apparently, there is an acceptance of the idea that the industry cur-
rently known for making cars is in a process of morphological shift into
mobility services, in part powered by new entrants acting between
vehicle manufacturers and their customers (Pallaro et al., 2015). This
shift is thought to have the potential to redeﬁne the relationship be-
tween vehicle manufacturers and their customers, and hence the future
of automobility in general.
These new options for personal mobility can take a variety of forms
(Münzel et al., 2019a). In this paper three distinct forms of ‘auto-
mobility-as-a-service’ (AaaS) are deﬁned: peer-to-peer car sharing; ride
sharing; and ride hailing. All three oﬀer a means to travel, but there are
signiﬁcant potential diﬀerences in terms of ownership of the assets, the
platform provided by the intermediary, and the ﬁt with user mobility
requirements. There is a dearth of information on this potentially im-
portant and diverse population of new automobility service providers
that could transform individual mobility, urban transport systems, and
the totality of automobility. AaaS is thus a classic ‘nascent’ market
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) in which there is experimentation and
uncertainty over the deﬁnition of products or services provided, com-
petition, and economic structures. As Casprini et al. (2019) observe
following their study of BlaBlaCar, more research is needed into the
multiplicity of start-ups and business models emerging around mobility
services.
In principle, diﬀerent approaches to automobility provision could
be combined along with public transport to create integrated ‘mobility-
as-a-service’ systems (Ambrosino et al., 2016). The concept of mobility-
as-a-service (MaaS) is well established (Kamargianni and Matyas, 2017).
It is all-embracing in that it combines multiple possible modes of travel
with public and private provision. MaaS is often seen from a transport
planning perspective as having the potential to disrupt the current
automobility system of private car ownership towards a more sustain-
able ‘post-car’ system (Audouin and Finger, 2018). In this paper the
concept of ‘automobility’ is as deﬁned by John Urry as a “…self-orga-
nizing autopoietic, non-linear system that spreads worldwide, and in-
cludes cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and many novel
objects, technologies and signs” (2004, p. 27).
Automobility-as-a-service (AaaS) is narrower than MaaS, entailing
the provision of personal passenger car transport services. Users of this
service may or may not own a car as well, though mainstream car
sharing is considered to result in a reduction in car ownership levels
(Kim et al., 2019; Becker et al., 2018; Meijer et al., 2019). The asset (the
car) is not owned by the platform company or the vehicle manufacturer,
it may be owned by an intermediary (including a ﬁnance provider or
car hire company) or by the driver. Drivers are not regarded as em-
ployees or even necessarily as self-employed (see BlaBlaCar below).
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However, car sharing per se, whether provided by a vehicle manu-
facturer or third party, does not constitute a network platform business
model - which involves digital intermediation between many suppliers
and many users. The example of car sharing used in the paper (Get-
around) was explicitly chosen because it is a peer-to-peer digital plat-
form business model.
Emergent technologies in electric traction, connectivity, autono-
mous control, big data, and the Internet of Things are enabling the
realisation of novel automobility services (Bohnsack and Pinkse, 2017;
Merfeld et al., 2019; Skeete, 2018). The implications for vehicle man-
ufacturers, their supply structures, and their attendant business models
are profound, but uncertain (Bidmon and Knab, 2018). However, the
scope of the incumbent automotive industry to absorb the disruptive
threat of independent network mobility business models has not been
explored in the literature. Previous research by Bergek et al. (2013) has
argued that incumbent industries may have the potential to integrate
new technologies into existing capabilities. We address this research
gap by trying to answer the following question: what is the expected
impact of AaaS on the incumbent car industry?
In an extreme vision of the implications, Airbib and Seba (2018)
argue that the private ownership of vehicles will cease, and the total
ﬂeet required will fall to 18% of current levels alongside much greater
vehicle longevity. Diﬀerent approaches to automobility-as-a-service
may have diﬀerent impacts on the automotive industry. Digital plat-
form businesses, made possible by advances in mobile tele-
communications and smartphone technology, are potentially the sort of
disruptive force that could destabilise existing economic structures,
redeﬁne markets, and render the existing incumbent vehicle manu-
facturers as residual suppliers. In short, automobility services are an
emergent phenomenon, part of a wider dynamic within the automotive
socio-technical system (Geels, et al., 2011). While often hailed as of-
fering the business mechanism behind a sharing economy, and hence
enhanced sustainability, recent research has started to identify the
potential for undesired rebound eﬀects associated with platform busi-
ness models (Warmington-Lundström and Laurenti, 2020).
Nonetheless, rather than comparing diﬀerent car sharing schemes,
we analyse diﬀerent approaches to automobility-as-a-service, of which
car sharing may be one, as enabled by platform business models. The
paper, consequently, has three main contributions. First, we oﬀer the
concept of ‘automobility-as-a-service’, as distinct from ‘mobility-as-a-
service’ (MaaS). This is an important distinction because with AaaS
there is no necessary and causal link to public transport or to transport
policy in general. The automobility element of MaaS is generally as-
sumed to be an integral component of a multi-modal and inter-con-
nected transport system wherein the cars are intended primarily as
feeders into and out of public transport nodes. Second, we identify that
automobility-as-a-service can be provided in a variety of formats, as
illustrated in part by our three examples. Each format carries speciﬁc
implications for automobility. Third, and more speculatively, we pro-
pose that automobility-as-a-service need not presage the decimation of
the automotive industry, nor contribute to more sustainable mobility,
and suggest reasons as to why that may be so.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. Section two provides
an account of academic research into network platform business models
with a focus on how the business acts as an intermediary between
providing a product-service, and those desiring a product-service of-
fering (Gawer, 2014; Hagiu and Wright, 2011). Section three oﬀers a
deﬁnition of three categories of AaaS. Section four outlines the meth-
odology adopted to inform section ﬁve which provides three vignette
examples: Getaround; BlaBlaCar; and Uber. These respectively re-
present peer-to-peer car sharing, ride sharing, and ride hailing. Section
six oﬀers analysis of network business models at a theoretical level, and
in terms of the impact of these models on the transformation processes
underway in the automotive industry. We argue that the business
models are not as disruptive as is often assumed, at least to date.
Conclusions for future research are drawn in section seven.
2. Network platform business models
To classify diﬀerent automobility service companies, the present
paper builds on the value-network business model (Stabell and
Fjeldstad, 1998; Fjeldstad and Snow, 2018). The value-network busi-
ness model is one owned by an individual ﬁrm and regards networks as
part of the content of the business model. Value creation follows the
principle of network externalities and increases as more participants
join. With direct network eﬀects, value increases as the membership
increases. Indirect eﬀects occur when participants use complementary
products that increase the value of the network. As network ex-
ternalities aﬀect value creation (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007), network
lock-in is important.The ‘platform’ business model whereby supply and
demand are mediated in an internal market, hosted by the focal ﬁrm
and usually accessible from a range of digital devices, is a speciﬁc
variant of the value-network businss model (Gawer, 2014;
Thomas et al., 2015). All three examples discussed in this paper are
versions of ‘platform’ business models.
The value-network business model has been unevenly applied in
diﬀerent industrial contexts such as the banking (Fjeldstad and
Sasson, 2010; Sasson, 2008), insurance (Fjeldstad and Ketels, 2006);
telecommunications (Andersen and Fjeldstad, 2003; Fjeldstad et al.,
2004); and newspapers (Burkay, 2012). In addition there has been
empirical study of the logistics and transport industry including ship-
ping companies (Lorange and Fjeldstad, 2012) and logistics service
providers (Huemer, 2006; Huemer, 2012; Wang et al., 2016). The
value-network model has been cited in studies on digital service plat-
forms (Ruutu et al., 2017; Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2017).
In terms of the research topics, existing studies focus on relational
connectedness and network embeddedness for ﬁrm performance and
survival (Fjeldstad and Sasson, 2010; Sasson, 2008), strategic actions
(Fjeldstad et al. 2004), competitive advantage (Fjeldstad and
Ketels, 2006), business models (Lorange and Fjeldstad, 2012;
Fjeldstad and Snow, 2018), and strategy tradeoﬀs (Fjeldstad and
Haanæs, 2001). In addition, there is some research into the launch of
mediating network platforms and subsequent network development
strategies (Burkay, 2012; Fjeldstad and Jakobsen. 2005;
Schilling, 2002) as well as strategizing scope and value-network ﬁrm
functions (Huemer, 2017). There are some studies applying the model
in situations where the focal ﬁrm is an intermediary between many
suppliers and many users in the provision of mobility, notably for UBER
(Zeng et al., 2019; Min et al., 2019; Guda and Subramaniana, 2019).
However, there is a lack of comparative studies on diﬀerent typologies
of network business models in automobility services. Hence, this paper
seeks to ﬁll the research gaps in terms of the application to automobility
services, the signiﬁcance of diﬀerent network business model typolo-
gies in this application, and the impact on the mainstream automotive
industry.
3. Business models of AaaS
This paper deﬁnes three main categories of AaaS network platform
business models: peer-to-peer car sharing; ride sharing; and ride
hailing. While all three models oﬀer a means to mobility there are
important characteristics that deﬁne and separate them. In car sharing,
the vehicle is provided to a user and the ‘service’ oﬀered is essentially
one of connecting users to vehicles, while users provide the actual
mobility service themselves. In ride sharing, the user is oﬀered a service
whereby they are connected to a car and driver, but the trip the driver is
taking is not necessarily undertaken just for the users’ beneﬁt. In ride
hailing, the service provided connects users to drivers, and the trips
generated are expressly to suit the purposes of the user. Table 1 (in
Session 5) provides details of the characterisation where the focus is on
the basic value proposition; how the mobility service is oﬀered (vehicle
ownership; whether users are drivers); the basis upon which costs are
charged (time, distance, or some combination; coverage of secondary
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costs notably insurance; the revenue model); the target market(s); and
the scale / scope of the case. The three models are therefore not only
diﬀerent from each other, they are also diﬀerent to the ‘traditional’
means of accessing automobility via personal ownership; daily rental;
or taxi. Note that ‘value’ can entail more than intrinsic monetary
(economic or ﬁnancial) value. There may be an extrinsic social or en-
vironmental element, as has been emphasised in early treatments of the
sharing economy and as appears to be the case in BlaBlaCar where ride
sharing substitutes for traditional hitchhiking (Casprini et al., 2019;
Jang et al., 2020).
3.1. Car sharing
Car sharing can take a variety of forms (Münzel et al., 2018; 2019b).
The essence is that cars are provided for shared use, for which usually
membership and some form of per-use payment is required from users.
Peer-to-peer car sharing via a digital intermediary platform is a distinct
subset of the car sharing market that may serve diﬀerent constituencies
and geographic markets than mainstream car sharing (Hampshire and
Gaites, 2011)
The membership and per-use payment rules provide for the ﬁrst
deﬁning parameters of the car sharing scheme in question. Lower cost
and simplicity may be traded oﬀ against ﬂexibility over use for ex-
ample. Time constraints, the need to book ahead, and a larger variation
in travel times have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on people's intention to
use a shared car (Kim et al., 2017a, 2017b). Other ‘external’ or con-
textual factors that might constrain the acceptance of car sharing
business models include socio-demographic considerations with
younger people more likely to adopt car sharing (Prieto et al., 2017), or
households already owning a car (Nijland and van Meerkerk, 2017).
While there is a substantial body of research on consumer or user at-
titudes to car sharing (Becker et al., 2017; Kent et al., 2017), and some
research on the implications for vehicle manufacturers (Bellos et al.,
2017), there is little on the business model aspects of the peer-to-peer
car sharing (AaaS) schemes themselves (Guyader and Piscicelli, 2019;
Meijer et al., 2019) or their impact on the automotive industry.
A signiﬁcant consideration for peer-to-peer car sharing is that there
are people with assets (i.e. cars) who are also willing to share those
assets (Wilhelms et al., 2017). The recruitment of vehicle owners is as
crucial as the recruitment of users. Thereafter, sharing patterns need to
be matched asymmetrically against personal use patterns. Schemes like
Getaround act as intermediaries between car owners and members who
would like to use a car. This is similar in principle to Airbnb for ex-
ample, with the intermediary taking a service charge fee. Hence a high
proportion of the budget is likely to be taken by advertising to recruit
cars and member drivers. These systems absolutely rely upon the ro-
bustness of all the support systems that surround vehicle use e.g. ve-
hicle licensing, insurance, driver licensing, roadworthiness testing and
related issues.
3.2. Ride sharing
Ride sharing has long existed at an informal level, from hitchhiking
to oﬃce-based schemes whereby commuters with similar patterns agree
to share a ride. Ride sharing may be actively promoted to reduce the
carbon and congestion impact of commuting and other travel
(Santos, 2018), though the concept is often conﬂated with car sharing
or ride hailing.
The principle of ride sharing is simple. A driver with a vehicle going
on a speciﬁed route may take another person or people on that route, or
a part thereof. Similar concepts now exist with respect to the delivery of
parcels, whereby the driver picks up a parcel and delivers to an address
or person. In either case, the driver may be remunerated at cost or for
proﬁt (see for example https://www.nimber.com/). As with peer-to-
peer car sharing, the recruitment of vehicle owners is therefore as
crucial as the recruitment of users. Riding in a car with strangers may
entail personal risk for example and thereby deter recruitment of users.
Some services oﬀer women drivers for women passengers, or attempts
are made to conceal the locational identity of riders (Aïvodji et al.,
2016).
3.3. Ride hailing
Ride hailing is an updated version of traditional taxi services, in this
case mediated via a digital platform. Again, in principle the operation
of ride hailing is simple enough. Users and providers both subscribe to
the platform. Users then request rides as required, and available drivers
can respond along with a quote for the anticipated journey cost, their
time of arrival, and the duration of the trip. A critical mass of drivers is
required to provide a service, while drivers need a critical mass of
subscribed users in order to have suﬃcient business. Episodes of peak
demand or under-supply can be managed by diﬀerential pricing me-
chanisms. Users and providers can in principle be subscribed to one or
more services to maximise their chances of getting the ride desired.
Ride hailing as a peer-to-peer proposition may readily meet oppo-
sition from established taxi service providers. Depending upon local
regulations, there may be a diﬀerence between so-called ‘black cab’ taxi
services, where potential users can literally hail a passing but empty cab
and request a trip, and pre-booked taxi services where such drivers and
vehicles are not allowed to collect passengers without having a pre-
booked order.
3.4. The disruptive potential of AaaS
In the study presented in this paper, we searched for evidence that
the application of AaaS via third-party network platform business
Table. 1
Characteristics of the Automobility-as-a-service examples
Getaround (formerly Drivy) BlaBlaCar UBER
Type of scheme Car sharing Ride sharing Ride hailing
Primary value proposition Asset utilisation for owners; lower total cost of
travel for users
Cost-spreading for owners; lower total cost
of travel for users
Income generation for owner – drivers; ﬂexibility
and low cost for users.
Source location France, 2010 France, 2006 USA, 2006
Scale Claims 5 million users, 20,000 cars and active in
300 cites
Claims 1.5 million users and 50,000 cars
in Europe
Claims 65 million users in 22 countries
Car ownership Car owned by an individual or third party Car owned by driver. Car owned by driver or third party.
Car driving Car driven by customer. Car driven by owner. Car driven by owner - driver.
Car insurance Car insured by Getaround during the rental period.
Also car recovery.
Insured by BlaBlaCa while there is a ride
share occupant.
Car insured via UBER during the period when the
driver's app is on.
Fare basis Fare determined on a time basis. Fare determined on a distance basis. Fare determined by a time / distance calculation.
Revenue model 30% taken by Getaround for own costs and
insurance. Car owners set the price.
Drivers only recover costs. BlaBlaCar takes
12%.
20–25% taken by UBER.
Target market Repeat drivers taking longer trips Riders taking longer trips Short-range, urban trips.
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models has disrupted the incumbent automotive industry, using the
examples as illustrative of diﬀering formats for AaaS. The assessment
requires that AaaS operators be identiﬁed as new intermediaries be-
tween vehicle manufacturers and car users, and of a scale that con-
stitutes a substantive challenge.
This approach entails three elements. First, evidence is needed on
the speciﬁc application of the platform concept in the delivery of AaaS
for each example. Evidence is also needed on the value proposition in
each case: The nature of the mobility service oﬀered, the ways users can
access and pay for the service; the ways the service is delivered. The
evolution of the business model is suggestive of learning processes, so
where such evolution is identiﬁed it can be implied that earlier versions
of the business model were in some respect defective and / or that later
iterations more precisely segmented the market. As with other platform
business sectors, there is unlikely to be a single business model to
dominate the AaaS market (Täuscher and Laudien, 2018). Second, the
signiﬁcance of the example is required – by which we mean identifying
indicators of the scale of the example in terms of business indicators
such as turnover or growth rates, or the attraction of ﬁnance capital.
Here scale is used as a proxy for potential disruption to the established
automotive industry, but caution is needed. That is, it might be that
AaaS becomes a very signiﬁcant part of the future landscape of auto-
mobility and yet is not meaningfully disruptive of the automotive in-
dustry. Further to this issue, it is important to understand how network
eﬀects create barriers to competitors, including those created by the
established automotive industry. In two-sided platform businesses a
vital consideration is how easily suppliers and users can be recruited
and then locked in, as these features will be important in determining
whether there are, for example, ﬁrst-mover advantages or whether
quasi-monopoly rents can be extracted in the future. Finally, indicators
are needed on the impact on the automotive incumbents, or alter-
natively how far AaaS can be accommodated within existing production
and retail practices. This last area is the most problematic in terms of
tracing cause and eﬀect, either for the automotive industry as a whole
or for individual vehicle manufacturers. Other incumbents in con-
temporary automobility may also suﬀer disruption: car rental compa-
nies or taxi companies for example. Alternatively, public transport
services or other modes may face substitution eﬀects.
4. Methodology
The methodological approach adopted for this paper is that of
‘longitudinal immersion’, an over-arching, iterative, multi-contextual
and reﬂexive means of developing a richly textured understanding of a
phenomenon or set of related phenomena (Wells and
Nieuwenhuis, 2017). The underlying aim of longitudinal immersion is
to be engaged with the social subjects of research, typically over a
protracted time period and with multiple points of engagement with the
intention of accumulating theoretical insights and empirical knowl-
edge. There are both critical and self-reﬂective aspects to this process
which may include testing research assumptions and understandings
against and through a wide range of social actors or agents. These actor
or agent can include other academic researchers, regulators, con-
sultancies, NGOs, businesses, and policymakers for example.
Longitudinal immersion therefore recognises that research in social
settings can proceed in a discursive manner via irregular and sometimes
complex engagements with social actors in combination with a wide
range of secondary sources. In this manner there may be reﬂexive and
instrumental components to the knowledge created in the research
process (Robinson and Kerr, 2015). As expressed by Thorpe et al.,
(2011) ‘…scholarship as a product is generated across a career of re-
search, user-group engagement, teaching and professional citizenship’
(Thorpe et al., 2011). The research team behind this paper combines
those with the longitudinal experience noted above, and those with the
deeper, more vertical immersion in a speciﬁc topic area (in this case,
car sharing) to create example vignettes (Barrus et al., 2016;
Heim et al., 2019) over a period of 36 months. Reﬂexivity was achieved
by periodic research team discussions over the emergent examples and
their impact.
As noted by Robinson and Kerr (2015) reﬂexivity seeks to embrace
the idea that researchers are not simply neutral bystanders who im-
partially observe events but can directly or indirectly eﬀect research
processes by virtue of deliberate participation in society and the speciﬁc
phenomenon that they seek to understand. This is evident in the par-
ticipation of the researchers in a H2020 project (see www.stars-
h2020.eu/), the purpose of which is to encourage car sharing. More-
over, the attempt to be engaged with the subject of study means that the
research seeks to be informed of the values, views, ideas, concerns, and
understandings of the subjects of research (Evered and Louis, 1981).
The research becomes embedded in a domain in which via both primary
contacts and secondary sources there is a greater ‘feel’ for the ways in
which behaviours and outcomes can be understood.
Longitudinal immersion is combined with qualitative research
which is particularly suitable for studying embryonic network platform
business models and the impact on the automotive industry as it helps
us to better understand emergent, socially grounded, phenomena in-
volving complex relationships (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Qua-
litative research produces ﬁndings resulting the natural unfolding of the
phenomenon under study emerges in contemporary contextual settings
(Yin, 1994; Patton, 2001).
Document analysis was employed as it is applicable to qualitative
research (Yin, 1994; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Previous studies
seeking to produce rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event or
organisation have relied solely on document analysis as it allows the
researcher to develop understanding by uncovering meaning and in-
sights relevant to the research question (e.g., Wild et al., 2010). In
support of this approach, the paper draws upon multiple sources of
evidence, which allows for data triangulation. Triangulation is deﬁned
as ‘…a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence
among multiple and diﬀerent sources of information to form themes or
categories in a study’ (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 126). Triangulation is
important because when data from diﬀerent sources converge, the re-
search oﬀer greater conﬁdence in the trustworthiness of the ﬁndings
(Bowen, 2009). For the examples chosen, the research triangulated
corporate documents and website material with a wide range of spe-
cialist and general press sources such as Financial Times, Automotive
News, Electrive.com, Fleet News, and ‘grey literature’ sources, along
with the authors’ own experiences of the services. A pre-established
understanding of the automotive industry helped to evaluate the sig-
niﬁcance of the diﬀerent network business models for the industry, in
for example remarketing schemes and the residual value of vehicles.
5. Automobility-as-a-service: the examples
The purpose of the examples presented here is to compare the dif-
ferent formats of AaaS oﬀerings, with the intention of highlighting the
implications for the automotive industry. None of these examples have
stations at which cars are necessarily parked, unlike many car sharing
schemes or taxi services for example. Table 1 summarises the examples.
5.1. Getaround car sharing
Drivy was a for-proﬁt company founded in 2010 in Marseille. The
core concept is to allow car owners to hire out their vehicles to other
users. It spread to several European countries and was acquired by
Getaround in 2019. Unlike its counterparts in the car sharing market,
Getaround does not try to capture drivers who need to take short trips
inside a city – it focuses instead on having repeat customers, and drivers
who need a car for longer trips (McLellan, 2018).
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5.1.1. Application of the network platform business model in peer-to-peer
car sharing
There is no subscription fee in this model, and a deposit is not re-
quired. At the end, drivers can leave reviews of their experience,
helping to ensure members are honest and fair. The insurance cover is
key to success in that it allows an individual to insure (and hence use)
an asset they do not own (Ralph, 2017). Cars must be under seven years
old. One value proposition that the company oﬀers is that new members
are oﬀered training on how to get started. Car owners can rent their car
out to other members, setting their own price with the help of an al-
gorithm provided by Getaround. Getaround sets a minimum (of £37 per
day) and maximum (of £202 per day) for car use. Getaround will also
install a box that provides a GPS and makes the car connected. This box
(called Drivy Open) also allows cars to be handed over to users without
the owner being present (Middleton, 2018). Car owners get to keep
80% of the rental amount, as Getaround keeps 13% and 7% goes to
Allianz for insurance costs. In the UK Getaround uses the AA roadside
rescue service, and other similar entities in other markets.
When starting in the UK market in 2017 Drivy oﬀered guaranteed
monthly payments of £250 to the ﬁrst 300 owners registering their
vehicle on the site. This is an indication of the signiﬁcance of recruiting
vehicle owners. There are several other entities with related car sharing
oﬀers. In the UK these include Zipcar (owned by Avis), Turo, and
HiyaCar (Elliot, 2018). Others are emerging in other markets, in-
dicating low barriers to entry. Each oﬀers a portfolio of vehicles and
pricing structures that eﬀectively act to segment the market for car-
based mobility.
5.1.2. Signiﬁcance of this application
The organisation had several public-private shareholders, such as
Nokia Growth Partners, Cathay Innovation, Index Ventures, Via ID, and
BPI France. Drivy raised £28 million in 2016 from venture capitalists,
and in 2017 claimed 1.5 million users and 50,000 cars across France,
Germany, Austria, Spain, Belgium and the UK (Gerrard, 2017;
McLellan, 2018). In April 2019 Drivy was purchased by Getaround (US)
for US$300 million and rebranded as Getaround EU. Getaround has a
partnership with UBER in the US called UBER Rent. It has also attracted
investment from Toyota and Ford. This shows that the model has been
able to attract investment, and to grow in scale quickly without the
need for the business to invest in actual vehicles.
The business is very small compared with the new car market, or
even with the annual purchases of the daily rental industry. Its sig-
niﬁcance rests on the relative ease of expansion and replication by other
businesses, and that it is a proﬁtable business model. Examples of other
independent peer-to-peer car sharing platforms include Turo, HiGear,
MoObie, and Nabobil. Maven, owned by GM, oﬀers a similar service.
5.1.3. Impact on the incumbent automotive industry
An important feature of the service is that it allows car owners (or
prospective owners) to underwrite the cost of purchase in whole or in
part (Smith, 2018). It therefore acts to stimulate demand. The company
claims that users will be able to abandon the idea of car ownership once
the network reaches a critical mass – but has not provided evidence for
this claim. An issue has been the diﬃculty of recruiting private asset
owners to allow their cars to be used by others. This problem can be
somewhat resolved by Getaround users accessing traditional car hire
companies via the app (Middleton, 2018). The automotive incumbents
have long used the daily rental industry as a route to market, and thus
far Getaround appears to be an unproblematic variation on that route.
Hence Getaround constitutes a slight variation in traditional routes to
market (as shown in Table 2, Section 6 below) along with enhanced
asset utilisation that is broadly beneﬁcial to the automotive industry.
Peer-to-peer car sharing is too small in scale to be disruptive to the
industry.
5.2. BlaBlaCar ride sharing
BlaBlaCar is probably the largest and most successful ride sharing
platform in the world. It started in France in 2006, but then expanded
into other European markets and beyond, including India but excluding
the US (Rodriguez, 2014; Cook, 2015). It could be argued that ride
sharing is a ‘natural ﬁt’ for the network platform business model, and
the growth of BlaBlaCar is illustrative of its appropriateness.
5.2.1. Application of the network platform business model in ride sharing
The basic proposition is very simple: passengers seeking a trip from
one point to another are quoted a price by BlaBlaCar. The price includes
VAT and the margin for BlaBlaCar (typically about 12%). Drivers get
the fee minus the VAT and the margin but are not expected to make a
proﬁt. Drivers are not charged a fee by BlaBlaCar. A quirky feature from
which the platform derives its name is that drivers and passengers are
rated (and self-rated) on how conversational they are. BlaBlaCar was
initially used for longer-range trips, not intra-urban travel – an average
trip distance of 220 miles according to Chen (2015). Entry costs for
drivers and passengers were therefore very low, making network ex-
pansion viable.
The expansion costs include signiﬁcant marketing outlays, and the
hardware and software needed to run the platform. However, BlaBlaCar
does not own vehicles or stations. Recruitment of drivers and potential
passengers is key to the initial base of the proposition, but changes had
to be made to the operation of the service from a ‘pay on use’ system to
a ‘pay in advance when booking’ system. The platform started initially
as a business-to-business proposition with paid-for advertising on the
website, but this proved cumbersome and expensive.
Farajallah et al. (2019) report that experienced drivers expanded the
number of successful trips oﬀered by lowering the price requested,
thereby increasing overall net revenue both for themselves and for
BlaBlaCar. Furthermore, Jang et al. (2020) argue that users consider
both intrinsic and extrinsic measures of quality when deciding to use
BlaBlaCar. In other words, in AaaS the transaction is evaluated as
personal service, and extends beyond a simple price comparison.
However, as Barbe and Hussler (2019) show, the imposition of pre-
determined decentralised evaluation systems by companies does not
necessarily support pluralism among users (drivers and riders).
Furthermore, operational security must be underwritten by in-
surance, and hence key to this has been partnership with insurance
providers such as Axa. This is in line with the requirement of new en-
trants to seek complementary assets (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The pro-
vided insurance is free of charge to drivers, additional to their existing
insurance, and applies as long as a BlaBlaCar passenger is in the car.
BlaBlaCar undertakes checks to assess identities including the use of
social media (e.g. Facebook) and verifying personal details such as
telephone numbers, bank accounts and email addresses. When a ride is
posted, the driver must declare that he or she holds a driving licence
and insurance, but this is not checked by the platform. Passengers must
trust the system and the drivers, for without this the service would fail
(Rose and Wheeler, 2017).
5.2.2. Signiﬁcance of this application
In 2014 BlaBlaCar raised US$100 million (£60m) from venture-ca-
pital ﬁrms led by ISAI, Index and Accel. It reportedly raised $160
million (£104 million) in new funding, which brought its valuation to
$1.2 billion (£780 million) in 2015, despite having only 2 million
regular monthly users (Chen, 2015; Cook, 2015). By 2015 total mem-
bership was 10 million, and by mid-2018 a reported 65 million regis-
tered users in 22 countries (Petzinger, 2018).
As the drivers do not make a proﬁt the platform is able to avoid
some of the regulatory concerns that have applied in e.g. UBER and
AirBnB. BlaBlaCar itself may make a proﬁt as an intermediary. This
outcome resonates with the view of Querbes (2018) who argues that
shared-economy business models cannot succeed on monetary
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motivations alone. However, it also resonates with the view of Dal Zotto
et al. (2018) that customers contribute to the value proposition – in the
case of BlaBlaCar via the mutual rating system. Ride sharing companies
include Hitch-A-Ride and Carma, albeit on a much smaller scale than
BlaBlaCar.
5.2.3. Impact on the incumbent automotive industry
By the end of 2015 the strategy of geographic market expansion was
struggling, with only Russia oﬀering signiﬁcant growth
(Schrieberg, 2017). The response was to instigate short-range trips
(circa 30 miles) in selected French cities as part of a wider strategy to
diversify the service into regular daily trips – and to compete directly
with public transport and providers like UBER. BlaBlaCar further struck
a deal with a French ﬁnance company to allow drivers to purchase low-
cost leases for Opel cars, and thus to oﬀer rides via the platform
(Auchard and Frost, 2017). BlaBlaCar helps car owners underwrite car
ownership costs, and thereby indirectly stimulates the market. The
agreement with Opel illustrates even closer ties as an alternative route
to market that is not disruptive to the automotive industry incumbents.
Ride sharing, as with peer-to-peer car sharing, allows asset owners to
spread the costs of ownership and therefore resolve concerns over total
cost of ownership. The automotive industry has long adopted ﬁnance
innovations to expand the market, and ride sharing seems to be one
more addition to this portfolio. The impact on the industry appears to
be further limited by cultural or other factors that limit the number of
asset owners prepared to participate.
5.3. UBER ride hailing
UBER is a ride hailing platform that connects drivers with passen-
gers, mostly for short-range trips. It is recognised as disruptive to the
traditional market and regulation of taxi services (Zwick, 2018).
5.3.1. Application of the network platform business model in ride hailing
Rapid expansion is key to the business model and to strategy. The
expansion rate ensures that the growth in customer numbers is matched
by drivers, and an area can be saturated with available cars.
Instrumental to UBER's success has been the ability to connect drivers to
customers in a short period of time. Moreover, by saturating an area
UBER can overwhelm competitors and thereby create barriers to entry
to other platform ride hailing concepts.
UBER can and does adjust the fares charged by drivers and the share
of such fares taken by UBER. Over time UBER has reduced the fares
charged, and increased the share taken (typically 20–25%). Inevitably,
this has put pressure on UBER driver earnings, but the over-supply of
drivers has ensured the service continues to operate. There is evidence
that actual per-hour earnings for drivers can be below ‘minimum wage’
rates (Henao and Marshall, 2019). Labour relations has been an on-
going area of concern for UBER and for regulators. The stance that
drivers are ‘self-employed’ adopted by UBER has not been universally
accepted. In some instances, UBER has agreed to subsidise pensions and
health insurance as a compromise (Sullivan and O'Connor, 2018).
UBER operates with four levels of service. UBERX is the basic
package at the lowest cost and can be oﬀered by all drivers. UBERPOOL
is a lower cost service whereby customers share rides for a 25% dis-
count (and hence integrates ride hailing with ride sharing). UBERXL is a
service oﬀered by drivers with larger vehicles, able to accommodate
larger groups. Lastly, UBEREXEC is a luxury package with higher fares
and newer, premium-brand cars. Given the public proﬁle of the busi-
ness it is unsurprising that research has been undertaken into the socio-
demographic characteristics of the users (e.g. Alemi et al., 2018) and
the impact of UBER on issues such the existing taxi ﬂeet (Chang, 2017),
the rest of the mobility system (Kim et al., 2018), and workers
(Fleming, 2017; Zwick, 2018).
5.3.2. Signiﬁcance of the ride hailing platform
This model of service delivery is readily understood by both sides of
the platform market. UBER has become a ‘household name’, emble-
matic of market disruption that redeﬁnes the oﬀer to consumers. The
long-run viability of UBER in ride hailing is still to be demonstrated.
UBER has several signiﬁcant competitors, at least at the regional level,
with Didi Kuaidi and Yidao Yongchi (China); Lyft (US), OlaCabs (India),
and Grabtaxi (Thailand) as prominent examples (Chen and Huet, 2015).
It is notable that some messaging apps have sought to enter the ride
hailing market around the world such as Line (Japan) and Daum KaKao
(South Korea).
Up to 2018, the focus on revenue growth allowed UBER to increase
the valuation of the business despite returning successive losses. UBER
subsidises rides and drivers in a bid to capture market share
(Hook, 2017), and the strategy has attracted signiﬁcant tranches of
investment such as the Saudi Arabia sovereign wealth fund providing
US3.5 billion in 2016. The wider signiﬁcance of UBER may reside in the
Table. 2
Routes to market and remarketing in the automotive industry.
Route Share of total new
registrations
Discount rate Ownership length Return route
VM sale to management 5–10% Up to 40% 6–12 months 1. Approved Used
VM sale to staﬀ Up to 35% 12–60 months 1. Approved Used 2. Independent auction
and dealers
VM sale to suppliers Up to 30% 36 months 1. Approved Used
VM marketing cars (National Sales Company) Up to 40% 6 months 1. Approved Used
VM franchised dealers demonstrator cars 8–12% Up to 40% 6 months 1. Approved Used
VM franchised dealers service cars Up to 40% 12–36 months 1. Approved Used
VM franchised dealers pre-registered cars Up to 40% 90 days 1. Approved Used
VM franchised dealers in-house rental cars Up to 30% 12–36 months 1. Approved Used
Rental cars 8–10% Up to 40% 6–12 months 1. Approved Used
Large ﬂeets 10 -20% Up to 30% 12–36 months 1. Approved Used 2. Independent auction
and dealers
Small and medium ﬂeets 10–15% Up to 30% 36–60 months 1. Approved Used 2. Independent auction
and dealers
User-chooser and ‘grey’ ﬂeets 10–15% 36–60 months 2. Independent auction and dealers
‘White’ ﬂeets and local authority; government agency, etc. 10–15% 36–60 months 2. Independent auction and dealers
Special category e.g. Motoability in the UK Up to 5%
Retail customers 20–50% 0 - 15% 36–60 months 2. Independent auction and dealers
VM AaaS schemes including those run by franchised or owned
dealerships
Less than 1% Up to 30% 12–36 months 1. Approved Used 2. Independent auction
and dealers
Independent AaaS schemes Less than 1% 0–15% 36–60 months 2. Independent auction and dealers
(Source: Derived from industry interviews, trade press, franchised dealerships)
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ability to leverage the brand into other horizontal markets in mobility.
Of note is the expansion of UBER into bicycle and kick-scooter sharing
schemes, helicopter rides, and into fast-food delivery (UBEREats).
UBER competitors mostly have a smaller geographic reach, but they
are increasing in number and scope as time passes (see for example
https://ride.guru/content/resources/rideshares-worldwide). Major
competitors as noted above are indicative that the fundamental model
is attractive to users, but also mostly disruptive to the existing taxi
industry rather than the automotive industry.
5.3.3. Impact on the incumbent automotive industry
It is possible that UBER has slightly reduced new car sales (to
conventional taxi ﬂeets), but it has probably expanded the overall
market by adding more purchases from prospective UBER drivers,
lowering ride hailing costs and displacing public transport. More re-
search is needed on this, though the study by Ward et al. (2019) sug-
gests a small reduction in total new car sales might be an outcome.
UBER has been one of the pioneers of autonomous cars. As early as
2016 UBER announced that it was using a Ford Fusion car ﬁtted with
multiple sensors to test autonomous driving (Morby, 2016). This car
was the product of collaboration between Carnegie Mellon scientists
and an UBER robotics lab (the UBER Advanced Technology Center) in
Pittsburgh (Mundy, 2015). It was reported that passengers in the au-
tonomous cars were required to sign waivers to keep UBER free of li-
abilities for injury or death in the event of a collision (Nunez, 2016).
UBER was involved in a long-running dispute with Waymo (the au-
tonomous car business owned by Alphabet) despite Alphabet owning
7% of UBER stock at the time (Harris, 2017). Thus far the relationships
have been mutually beneﬁcial, while the non-car business of UBER
remain marginal. Furthermore, because UBER does not purchase the
core assets (the cars) it has no volume leverage with vehicle manu-
facturers. UBER drivers remain free to choose from the usual range of
cars available within broad limits of aﬀordability and practicality, so
the ‘normal’ new car market is not unduly changed.
6. Discussion
The illustrative examples show there are multiple types of network
platform business models, even within the same broad market of ap-
plication. There is a dearth of data on the operational aspects of these
business models. There is also an evolutionary character to emergent
AaaS and the business models to provide such services. However,
contextual framing is signiﬁcant in the case of automobility, which is
deeply embedded as a socio-technical regime and hence more able to
‘manage’ potential disruption.
With platforms like Getaround, prospective owners might consider
that using this personal asset to derive additional income may help
oﬀset the cost of purchase or allow the purchase of a more expensive
car. More intense use may result in cars being re-sold after a shorter
period of initial ownership, and hence may support continued new car
sales and the used car trade. It is likely that more cars will be in cir-
culation than in the absence of such systems. Getaround does not
threaten the industry or automobility as deﬁned by Urry (2004). In the
Getaround model the idea of people driving cars for themselves is re-
tained, as is continued reliance on the car as the core of the mobility
system.
There are doubts about the longevity of the propensity to use shared
vehicles (Mattia et al., 2019), especially following the demise of Autolib
in Paris. The need for ‘lock in’ for Getaround, UBER and BlaBlaCar is
evidenced in the desire of all three to expand their network size as
rapidly as possible, and thereby ‘occupy’ the market. To achieve net-
work scale, Getaround has if anything migrated to being closer to the
mainstream automotive industry incumbents by sourcing cars from
rental companies. The Getaround strategy, and that of BlaBlaCar,
therefore seeks to resolve the problem identiﬁed by
Wilhelms et al. (2017) of persuading owners of assets to share those
assets on the market.
With the BlaBlaCar model there is a ‘social’, ‘shared’ and ‘not for
proﬁt’ content and philosophy rather like old-fashioned hitchhiking,
but BlaBlaCar also represents intensiﬁcation of use and possible pur-
chase of more new cars. Individual owners have their costs covered,
which logically will provide a greater incentive to make trips. Neither
does BlaBlaCar threaten the industry or the primacy of the car. If
anything, this model challenges the long-range bus and rail systems.
For UBER, research in the US suggests that ride hailing services
extend automobility into neighbourhoods with low rates of car own-
ership and into rural areas, with signiﬁcant social beneﬁts
(Brown, 2019). This is not a threat to the automotive industry, even if
others doubt the reduction in social exclusion (Clark and Curl, 2016).
Still, UBER might be a long-term threat with the well-documented in-
terest in autonomous vehicles and the expansion into other urban
transport modes. The provision of UBER via autonomous cars would
eﬀectively mean UBER ceases to be a platform business as deﬁned in
this paper as the many suppliers (drivers) would disappear from the
two-sided market. Micro-mobility oﬀers (McKenzie, 2019; Peters and
MacKenzie, 2019) may act together with car exclusion policies in urban
areas to reduce the utility of car ownership and / or use, thereby un-
dermining the market for new cars. If UBER does become a successful
‘mobility’ brand, it may increasingly own the relationship with the
customers and demote vehicle manufacturers to the status of (com-
modity) suppliers.
UBER has attracted the interest of vehicle manufacturers: Toyota
invested US$500 million in 2018 (Bradshaw, 2018). In similar vein
Gett, an Israeli start up founded in 2009, received a US$300 million
investment from Volkswagen Group in 2016; and Lyft founded in 2012
had US$500 million investment from GM in 2016 as part of a bigger
US2 billion fund-raising round. In 2018, with a focus on autonomous
technologies. Another major agreement includes Volvo with UBER
(Campbell and Hook, 2018). In addition, UBER and Daimler entered a
similar agreement. UBER at least has the potential to privilege some
vehicle manufacturers over others, and thereby contribute to the long-
term structure of the industry. The Chairman, Dieter Zetsche, was
quoted as saying:
“As the inventor of the automobile, Daimler aims to be a leader in
autonomous driving—one of the most fascinating aspects of reinventing
mobility. Mobility service providers oﬀer an ideal platform for auton-
omous driving technology and UBER is a leading mobility platform
company. The real revolution in future mobility lies in intelligently
linking the four major trends we call CASE: connectivity, autonomous
driving, sharing and electric mobility. And we will certainly be the
driver of these changes.” (Cited in Daimler, 2017).
These are signiﬁcant investments but, as the three examples show,
success even in narrowly business terms may be elusive.
These structural shifts and business model innovations are likely to
be associated with wider developments around the quest for a circular
economy (Ciulli et al., 2019), the separation of economic growth from
ecological burdens, and the re-orientation of production and con-
sumption to a service model rather than an ownership model
(Pallaro et al., 2015). The automotive industry is deeply enmeshed in
these wider developments as discussed above. Studies on the impact of
network business models on incumbents assume disruption
(Lasmar et al., 2019). Clearly the speciﬁc instance of AaaS may be
contributory to the structural changes in the automotive industry, but is
unlikely to be signiﬁcant as a single source of change – hence a full
understanding of these network platform business models needs to be
underpinned by locating the analysis within wider changes underway in
the provision of automobility. This constitutes a bigger research
agenda.
Whether consumers are prepared to participate in AaaS, at least in
scale to disrupt the industry, is not yet certain. These are deeply con-
tested outcomes (Schwanen, 2016). Indeed, one key element of this
contestation is the struggle for control over the entire value creation
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and capture system for personal automobility (Weiller et al., 2015). In
other words, there are potential synergies in the co-evolution of these
themes into an AaaS industry (Viviani, 2016), but at present AaaS re-
mains a marginal activity that has largely been marginal, captured or
controlled by the incumbents.
Network platform business models are readily applied to auto-
mobility services and, as this paper shows, in a variety of formats. While
BlaBlaCar is closest to the ‘sharing economy’ ideal, it is Getaround and
UBER that have scale, and therefore inﬂuence. Even then, the scale of
operations is vanishingly small compared with the annual global new
car market (see Table 2 below). The AaaS concept highlights the in-
cremental and non-disruptive character of the activities of these net-
work platform businesses, however UBER at least has the potential to
privilege some vehicle manufacturers over others, and thereby con-
tribute to the long-term structure of the industry.
There are multiple pathways or routes to market in between the
vehicle leaving the factory and being in use in the market. These dif-
ferent routes vary widely depending upon multiple factors including the
position and strategy of the vehicle manufacturer, the size and char-
acter of the various sub-markets to be accessed, the demand-supply
position for individual models and variants of models, and the relative
capacity of the ‘remarketing’ structures for each manufacturer. These
all vary with time, and with each market under consideration. AaaS
ﬂeets may be considered as a new pathway or route to market with
some distinct features depending upon the business model in question.
It is therefore pertinent to give some consideration to these routes to
market, to understand the potential impact of car sharing on the market
overall.
Table 2 summarises the diﬀerent routes to market. In so doing, the
Table provides estimates of some of the important parameters asso-
ciated with each route to market. These parameters have been discussed
with industry experts and participants, but equally it must be under-
stood that the parameters are guideline estimates only in what is a
complex and dynamic situation. Indeed, the marketing and remarketing
of cars is a constant process of adjustment in a bid to reconcile the
relentless ﬂow of the manufacturing system against the intermittent
demands of the market.
Potentially there are many routes to market, with varying rates of
discount on oﬃcial list price, varying holding periods, and diﬀerent
return routes. At present AaaS schemes are a residual fraction of the
overall market, and probably in total less important than, say, the
number of demonstrator vehicles registered per dealer across most
markets. The integration of AaaS with other technology developments,
in for example electric powertrain or autonomous driving, further re-
duces the potential of new entrants to disrupt the incumbent industry
because it requires mastery of a growing range of competences.
AaaS oﬀered via independent platform business models therefore
represent a very small intermediation in the market structures of the
automotive industry. Equally, the notion that the sharing economy via
platform business models will contribute to sustainability is by no
means self-evident (Laukkanen, M. and Tura, N. (2020), as our ex-
amples suggest. None of the examples challenge consumption practices
around automobility (Lai and Ho, 2020) More research is needed into
the negative externalities of platform business models.
7. Conclusion
All the mobility (value-network) platform business models discussed
in this paper arise out of dissatisfaction with private car ownership and
use but they remain mechanisms by which the automobility system is
perpetuated. The ﬂuidity in the business models is potentially im-
portant for the ultimate relationship these AaaS providers have with the
automotive industry. In particular, we observe a growing closeness to
the incumbent industry and market structures that will reduce the
disruptiveness of the cases. The provision of AaaS is therefore not ne-
cessarily a contribution to MaaS but ﬁts seamlessly into existing
automotive industry practice. It is concluded that AaaS delivered by
network platform business models is not disruptive to the automotive
industry, nor to the primacy of the car in contemporary transport sys-
tems. AaaS is important for precisely this reason: It may allow the
perpetuation of the automotive industry and of mass automobility, and
thereby assist the industry in resisting transformative change.
Alternatively, it may be that as a powerful and resourced incumbent
industry, the automotive sector is best placed to initiate, integrate and
manage multi-faceted system change within which AaaS is but one
component element. Such integration constitutes another form of the
‘bridging’ activities identiﬁed by Berggren et al. (2015). There is a re-
newed interest in the activities of incumbents beyond characterising
them as unhelpfully obstructive, to understand how cross-sector tran-
sitions might be facilitated (Andersen et al., 2019; Rosenbloom, 2019).
More profoundly, the paper suggests that the attention given to the
innovative and the disruptive may obscure the resilience of incumbent
organisations and practices as constituted within highly complex and
inter-dependent socio-technical systems (Bergek et al., 2013). Further
research is needed to elaborate the network business model typology
outlined here, and to locate the historical and spatial speciﬁcity of AaaS
models in order to explain how and why such models are successful in
some locations and times, but not in others. The greater research
challenge is to situate business model innovation in over-arching, long-
run, and system-wide processes of socio-technical change. A ﬁrst step is
to understand the implications for new car sales from the vehicle
manufacturers. Initial research by Ward et al. (2019) suggests a modest
reduction in registrations (in the US) of 3% in the period 2005 to 2015.
This last area is the most problematic in terms of tracing cause and
eﬀect, either for the automotive industry as a whole or for individual
vehicle manufacturers. Other incumbents in contemporary auto-
mobility may also suﬀer disruption: car rental companies or taxi com-
panies for example. Alternatively, public transport services or other
modes may face substitution eﬀects. AaaS may act simply to expand the
market via more precise segmentation of automobility oﬀerings, and in
this way the sharing economy results in more mobility, not less. There
are therefore many research questions to follow on once AaaS is deﬁned
as a phenomenon.
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